Thanks to Petros (one of our readers), we came across this interesting essay by Fr Georgios Lekkas, a priest in the Patriarchate of Constantinople’s Belgium diocese.  It’s well-written and erudite.  Unfortunately, it proceeds from some faulty premises, which ultimately invalidate, or at the very least, call into question, its arguments.  I will critique the most egregious of these on a case-by-case basis.   (To avoid confusion, my points will be italicized throughout the course of his essay.  In addition, I  will provide my own conclusions at the bottom, in an Afterword.)

In the interests of fairness, here it is in the original without any commentary:  https://orthodoxtimes.com/fr-georgios-lekkas-orthodoxy-in-the-third-millenium-and-an-orthodox-lingua-franca/

Orthodoxy in the Third Millenium and an Orthodox Lingua Franca

The ethno-phyletic ideology of the 19th and early 20th centuries led within the Orthodox East to the formation of independent nation-states in the political sphere and the establishment of corresponding autocephalous national churches in the ecclesiastical realm. While nation-states, under international law, retain the right to support and protect their citizens globally, autocephalous national churches have, over time—particularly following the fall of Communism—, similarly asserted global ecclesiastical jurisdiction over their ethnically defined flocks, irrespective of geographical location. This stance directly contravenes the canonical framework for Church organization and administration established by the Ecumenical Councils of the first millennium (cf. Zizioulas, The Orthodox Church, II, b 4). [This is true as far as it goes, the Church in the first millennium was based on autonomous metropolitan regions {cf Apostolic Canon 34}.  Contrary to post-Vatican I propaganda, there was no universal jurisdiction in the first millennium.]

This uncanonical practice is particularly evident in the Orthodox Diaspora, where parallel ecclesiastical communities, organized along ethnic lines, have been established in the same geographic regions, each led by its own ethnically affiliated bishop. This arrangement contravenes the fundamental Orthodox ecclesiological principle that mandates a single Eucharistic assembly per locale under the authority of one bishop (as outlined in the 8th Canon of the First Council, the 8th Canon of the Third Council, and the 12th Canon of the Fourth Ecumenical Council). Such practices, characterized by Meyendorff as an ‘ecclesiological heresy’ (p. 24), have exacerbated tensions among competing Orthodox national churches, each striving to expand its global influence under the guise of serving the liturgical needs of its diaspora communities. This approach, which constitutes a surrender to the third temptation of Christ, undermines ecclesiastical unity and poses a serious risk of deepening divisions, potentially leading to a major schism that threatens the very essence of the Church of Christ (cf. Papathomas, La Res. oppositionnelle, sec. C). It is even possible that this disregard for ‘spiritual laws’ could escalate into global conflicts, including nuclear confrontations. [This is correct:  we are indeed on the precipice of schism; unfortunately much of this is because the papalist pretentions of the current Patriarch of Constantinople.]

It is particularly disheartening to observe that while the flock of the Roman Catholic Church increasingly trends toward Protestantization [if by “Protestantization” one means modernism, ecumenism and secularism, then Lekkas must acknowledge which of these “diaspora” jurisdictions are succumbing to this heresy] the national Orthodox churches, through their global jurisdictional claims over ethnic diasporas, are inadvertently introducing papal-like structures into Orthodoxy. This is evident in the acceptance of parallel ecclesiastical jurisdictions within the same locality, which necessitate bishops whose primary allegiance lies with their mother churches rather than with the catholicity of the local Church under a single bishop.  [So, is universal jurisdiction wrong?  It would seem so per Lekkas’ own words on the matter.]

Episcopal Assemblies, modelled after Roman Catholic Conferences and Protestant European Federations, are currently designed to address the immediate need for cooperation among the overlapping Orthodox jurisdictions in the Diaspora. However, lacking both conciliarity and canonical legitimacy, they constitute, as Metropolitan Gregory of Peristeri aptly notes, a deviation from the conciliar structure of the Orthodox Church (Papathomas, Diaspora, p. 18). Rather than exporting Orthodoxy’s canonical structure to the West, these assemblies instead adopt the West’s uncanonical ecclesiological practices. [Good points.  Why don’t they form into local autonomous churches with territorial synods?  If the current incumbent on the “Ecumenical Throne” has immediate and universal authority over the “Diaspora”, then why doesn’t he force these ethnic eparchies to congeal into local churches with holy synods?  Is it because he really doesn’t have that authority?]

The ethno-phyletic Orthodox communities of the Diaspora, which thrived in the 20th century under particular historical and cultural conditions, have undeniably enabled members of autocephalous national Orthodox churches to preserve their faith abroad, often rooted in nostalgia for their homeland’s traditions. However, this preservation has come at the expense of ecclesiological unity, which fundamentally requires one local Church under a single bishop (Schmemann, p. 46). As Meyendorff aptly observes, Orthodox Christians in the Diaspora are deprived of the ‘visible unity’ necessary for effectively fulfilling their missionary calling in increasingly de-Christianized Western societies. Without this unity, Orthodoxy cannot adequately manifest the new life in the Holy Spirit bestowed by Christ (Meyendorff, pp. 28–29). For this reason, in order to embrace its historic missionary role, Orthodoxy must urgently move from fragmented ethnic enclaves to unified, multi-ethnic local Orthodox churches within the Diaspora.

To restore canonical normalcy, it is imperative, as Metropolitan Gregory of Peristeri highlights, to differentiate between the ‘ethnic diaspora’, which remains insular and inward-focused, and the ‘ecclesiastical diaspora’, which must be outward-facing and inclusive, embracing the stranger (Papathomas, Diaspora, pp. 16, 19–20). Achieving a return to canonical order necessitates a liturgical life conducted exclusively in the local language, within a unified local church in each geographic region, governed by a single bishop [so far, so good] and a synod chaired by the Ecumenical Patriarch [did you catch the old bait-and-switch?  Since when are local churches “chaired” by the Ecumenical Patriarch?  This certainly wasn’t the case in the first millennium, not even the Pope had universal jurisdiction.]. This arrangement would act as an interim structure under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate within the territory of the Patriarchate of Rome, until the restoration of full communion between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches (cf. Papathomas, Diaspora, pp. 18–19; Pnevmatikakis, p. 9). [We’re clearly going off the rails here.  It appears that Lekkas’ words are further evidence of what many have long feared, namely, that Patriarch Bartholomew is a stalking horse for the Vatican.]

What kind of penetration into local communities can parishes, or even more challenging, metropolitan churches in the Diaspora, achieve, especially when they almost exclusively use the national language of the mother church rather than the local language? [Agreed.] How can this approach align with the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’s Encyclical regarding the ‘strengthening of local identity’? (§15, cf. Keramidas, p. 38). However, it must be immediately recognized that effective Orthodox witness in the Diaspora requires the exclusive use of the local language in liturgical settings. If one must use the local language for work, daily life, and even leisure abroad, why should this not apply equally to collective public worship? [I’m curious, does Fr Lekkas serve the liturgies in Dutch and French, the local languages of Belgium?]

The competition among national Orthodox Churches for global jurisdiction in the Diaspora is largely driven by the understandable desire of the faithful to worship God in their own language. In my view, any efforts to restore the visible unity of the Orthodox Church in the Diaspora—and beyond—must begin by addressing the linguistic issue.  [No argument here. The Orthodox Church in America has been liturgizing in English for well over a century.]  More to the point, is Lekkas remotely aware of how the various eparchies of Constantinople did everything in their power to squelch the use of the vernacular?  Where was the evangelical fervor of these bishops when it was needed?]

Christianity spread across the world during a time when Greek served as the global lingua franca. The contemporary need for re-evangelization of a formerly Christian world that is now either completely de-Christianized or, at best, rapidly Protestantizing, coupled with the task of evangelizing populations who have yet to encounter Christ (cf. Message of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, §§ 2 and 7), calls for the adoption of enlightened initiatives and a pan-Orthodox consensus. This should include the learning and use of a common lingua franca for all Orthodox populations worldwide, taught alongside their national language from the earliest years of life.  [Ideal, but totally impractical.  Nothing would drive the young further from the Church than to mandate learning entire liturgies in a foreign language.  This proposal stands in stark contrast to his thoughts as expressed in the previous paragraph.]

This initiative could begin as a common Orthodox language of worship and communication, initially among the Balkan Orthodox peoples and Churches, since the solution to this issue must originate from where it first arose. Collaboration between each national autocephalous Orthodox Church and sympathetic local political and party formations could help promote this idea on a national level. Organizations such as the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy could further support this initiative internationally, and, in time, the World Council of Churches could embrace it as the global lingua franca for all Christians. [The WCC?  Haven’t they done enough damage the Christian witness?]

Personally, I would very much like to see Greek—the language of the Gospels—become the Orthodox lingua franca [of course!], as its widespread learning would provide large sections of the global population with direct access to texts of unparalleled spiritual value. However, I would also be willing to accept any language adopted as the Orthodox lingua franca, seeing it as a divine gift, since I believe that having a shared language is infinitely preferable to its complete absence. [OK, I’ll take the bait:  how about Church Slavonic?  After all, 80 percent of all Orthodox Christians use this as their liturgical language.]

The only acceptable exception to using the local language for liturgical purposes should be the adoption of a common Orthodox lingua franca, if and when such a language is agreed upon by pan-Orthodox consensus. A shared Orthodox language, serving as the sole alternative to the local language, would strengthen bonds among Orthodox Christians both locally and globally. It would act as a visible symbol of unity in faith and gradually facilitate the systematic translation of the rich literary treasures of various national ecclesiastical traditions into this language, making them accessible to all.  [Like Esperanto?]

The Diaspora must and can serve as a pilot model for autocephalous national Orthodox Churches. These churches might one day provide not only parishes using the local language but also parishes employing a universally accepted Orthodox lingua franca, should such a language be established.  [Again, that would be Church Slavonic.]  The Diaspora, as a multi-ethnic space, presents ideal conditions for the restoration of Orthodox ecclesiology in alignment with Christ’s vision for the Church as expressed in His High Priestly Prayer. It could thereby become a prototype for autocephalous national Orthodox Churches seeking to take meaningful steps toward reestablishing Christ’s pre-ethno-national vision for His Church (cf. Maximos, Metropolitan of Sardis, p. 332).

If the establishment of local daughter Churches in the Diaspora can significantly reduce the competition among autocephalous national Orthodox Churches, the adoption of an Orthodox lingua franca would serve as a decisive step toward fostering the visible unity of all Orthodox Christians. [This patently ridiculous:  perhaps Qenya or Sindarin?  How about Klingon?]

Allow me to conclude these reflections with a recent personal testimony. A few days ago, I was approached by a Muslim woman, previously unknown to me, who had experienced a profound dream and sought to share it with an Orthodox priest. She appeared unexpectedly at the parish table we host after the Sunday Divine Liturgy, her head modestly covered with a traditional light blue scarf, her round and serene face evoking an image of the Virgin Mary. She recounted her dream: the heavens opened, and everything was suffused with radiant white light. Within this divine light, a magnificent Orthodox church with many domes appeared, and she distinctly heard the words: ‘Follow this’.

In what language, if not the local one, can we welcome these people, whom Christ calls in every way and from all places?  [How about the language she addressed you in?]

 

 AFTERWORD

Kidding aside, it is clear that the thrust of Fr Lekkas’ essay is that the Ecumenical Patriarch has universal jurisdiction over the ethnic eparchies that exist throughout the Diaspora.  In addition, he writes that any local Churches that eventually arise in said Diaspora should be under the chairmanship of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

This of course is derives from a faulty understanding of Canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council (451) which was held in Chalcedon.  According to modern propagandists in Istanbul, this canon gives the Patriarch of Constantinople authority over “barbarian lands.”  In its earliest understanding, it only gave Constantinople authority only over three provinces which were contiguous to it –Asia, Pontus, and Thrace.  (Roughly modern day Turkey and Bulgaria.)  In any event, Pope Leo I the Great ordered that this canon be stricken from the acta of the Council.

While many denizens of the Phanar presently may subscribe to this theory, it does not comport with history.  Any objective study of Christianity in the first millennium should put any such fantasies to rest.  Even bishops from Constantinople once sang a different tune, one that upheld conciliarity and primacy, not supremacy.  Here for example is the late John Zizioulis, Metropolitan of Pergamum, one of the most distinguished theologians in the recent past:

If the Ecumenical Patriarch secures the consent of the local Autocephalous Churches by obtaining their written consent, he may sign the Patriarchal Tome on his own..if the Ecumenical Patriarch alone signs the Tome of Autocephaly, pan-Orthodox consensus is in no way degraded, as he is acting on what has already been decided.  The consent of all the Primates, and naturally, also the Primate of the Mother Church, should have been given in advance.  The Ecumenical Patriarch has a coordinating ministry…And he does this after having communicated with all the other Patriarchs.  This has no relation to papal primacy.  The Pope expresses his opinion without asking others,  The Ecumenical Patriarch seeks to secure the opinion of other and simple expresses it.” (Zizioulis, John; quoted by Nikiforos, Metropolitan of Kykkos and Tyllirus, The Ecclesial Crisis in Ukraine and Its Solution According to the Sacred Canons, p 22 (2021: Holy Trinity Publications, New York; Emphasis added.)

Even Patriarch Bartholomew had a more sober (i.e. conciliar) understanding of normative Orthodox ecclesiology while he was Metropolitan of Chalcedon:

Autocephaly and autonomy are granted by the whole church through a decision of the Ecumenical Council. Since, for various reasons, convening an Ecumenical Council is not possible, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as the coordinator of all the Orthodox Churches, grants autocephaly or autonomy, provided [the other Orthodox Churches] give their approval.  (Ibid, p 21; Emphasis added.)

As to the composition of an Orthodox “lingua franca”, I am afraid that is most unrealistic (for obvious reasons).  More to the point, is Lekkas even remotely aware of how the various eparchies of Constantinople did everything in their power to squelch the use of the vernacular?  Where was the evangelical fervor of these bishops when it was needed?  (If one were cynical, the answer would be because these same bishops were dependent upon remittances from the Diaspora in order to fund their salaries.)

At the risk of being uncharitable, Lekkas’ seems to have uncritically imbibed the most recent Constantinopolitan propaganda.  To do so, he chooses sources that do not have administrative concerns, whether parochial or episcopal.  In other words, no matter how eminent they may be (e.g. Schmemann, Meyendorff), they are academic.  The only one who is a diocesan ordinary is Metropolitan Grigorios Papathomas of the Diocese of Peristeri (Church of Greece).

In other words, they are not pastors with oversight of parishes or archpastors presiding over extant dioceses.  Except for Papathomas, they are titular bishops (e.g. Maximus of Sardis, John of Pergamum).  No matter how erudite and scholarly, they have little to no experience with pastoring a parish (much less a diocese), especially so if it is an ethnic one in the Diaspora.  To be blunt, part of the obstacles that we experience in the Diaspora arise due to long-standing inter-ethnic rivalries, which Lekkas (to his credit)  acknowledges.  Regrettably, he seems to be unaware that many of these rivalries are often aggravated by local clergy.

It is particularly distressing when we take into account that quite often, bishops from the overlapping jurisdictions themselves instigate such rivalries.  Often, they arise locally; other times it is due to exigencies which arise in their foreign homelands.

Indeed, this inter-episcopal animosity has a long and storied history, one which originated over a century ago thanks to the placement of Meletius IV Metaxakis on the Constantinopolitan throne (1871-1936).  Metaxakis, a notorious modernist and secret Freemason, looked the other way when the Soviet government persecuted the Russian Orthodox Church.  (Some would say he welcomed this persecution.)  In any event, this regrettable Russophobia continued in fits and starts throughout the Cold War and should have abated with the fall of the Soviet Union.  Unfortunately, it has intensified during the archpastorate of Patriarch Bartholomew, who in his abject fear and envy of the resurgent Russian Orthodox Church, has precipitated a schism in the Ukraine.  Worse, he sided with the globalists by aiding and abetting a horrible war in that unfortunate country.

Finally, as to the reality of the local jurisdictions coalescing into authentic local Churches, please allow me to proffer a personal observation as to why I believe this will not –and cannot–happen anytime soon:

In 1994, twenty-nine American Orthodox bishops across all jurisdictions came together at the Antiochian Village in Ligonier, PA, for the express purpose of forming an American Orthodox Church.  Upon hearing this news, Patriarch Bartholomew (who was newly-enthroned), crushed this movement, even going so far as to force the Greek Orthodox bishops who attended this conference to repudiate their signatures from the Ligonier documents.  In the interim, the desire for unity has attenuated.  Regardless, because of this egregious action, many Orthodox Christians question his good faith in matters related to Orthodox unity.

To be sure, this same Patriarch has attempted to heal the scandalous divisions which exist in the Diaspora through the mechanism of regional “Episcopal Assemblies”.  Given the intrinsic distrust that exists thanks to Bartholomew’s previous actions, for many of the non-Greek bishops, this is “too little, too late.”  When coupled with his headlong rush towards ecumenism and modernism, this only adds more fuel to the fires of distrust.  To put not too fine a point on it, these Episcopal Assemblies appear to be nothing more than clever attempts to quash the formation of authentic local Churches.

Bluntly stated, it is hard to square traditional Byzantine supremacism with authentic Christian evangelism as properly understood.  If anything, Lekkas’ essay unwittingly gives away the game.